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impact of the DeSimone holding may be of considerable importance
to the law of zoning as applied to multiple-family dwellings. The
holding in DeSimone reflects a marked change in the attitude of the
courts from that of earlier years. The view adopted in DeSimone, that
multiple-family dwellings can be employed as an instrument of social
policy and can result in a benefit to the public, represents a clear con-
trast to Euclid's concept of the parasitic apartment.
JOHN A. PARKINS, JR.
ART INVESTMENT EXPENSE DEDUCTIONS AND THE
PRIMARY PURPOSE REQUIREMENT
In recent years, collecting works of art has become an increasingly
popular form of investment.' As with any investment, however, con-
sideration must be given to its income tax consequences. In this regard,
a taxpayer will not be entitled to deduct the expenses of maintaining
his investment property pursuant to section 212 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 19542 [hereinafter referred to as the Code] if such prop-
erty is held "primarily as a sport, hobby, or recreation."3 Therefore, the
Many investors have grown discouraged by a faltering stockmarket and con-
cluded that spiraling art prices represented an excellent hedge against inflation.
NEwswEEK, Sept. 22, 1969, at 97; U.S. NEws & WORLD REPoRT, June 8, 197o , at 9o.
2The Internal Revenue Code provides:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or in-
curred during the taxable year -
(i) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of pro-
perty held for the production of income....
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 212 (emphasis added).
'rhe Treasury Regulation provides:
(c) Expenses of carrying on transactions which do not consti-
tute a trade or business of the taxpayer and are not carried on
for the production or collection of income or for the manage-
ment, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the
production of income, but which are carried on primarily as a
sport, hobby, or recreation are not allowable as nontrade or non-
business expenses. The question whether or not a transaction is
carried on primarily for the production of income or for the
management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for
the production or collection of income, rather than primarily as
a sport, hobby, or recreation, is not to be determined solely from
the intention of the taxpayer but rather from all the circumstances
of the case. For example, consideration will be given to the record
of prior gain or loss of the taxpayer in the activity, the relation
between the type of activity and the principal occupation of the
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art investor who wishes to deduct the expenses of maintaining his art
investments must be able to prove 4 that his investment purpose is
primary to whatever pleasure he receives from owning art.5 If the art
investor is successful in satisfying the court as to his purpose, he will be
entitled to deduct expenses for the "management, conservation, or
maintenance of property held for the production of income . . .,,
However, as was illustrated by the decision of the United States Court
of Claims in Wrightsman v. United States,7 the art investor may en-
counter peculiar difficulties in satisfying the court as to his primary
purpose.8
The plaintiffs in Wrightsman were wealthy art enthusiasts who
maintained an intricately catalogued, internationally famous collection
of nineteenth century French art.' 0 Over three quarters of this multi-
million dollar collection" was housed in a New York apartment where
taxpayer, and the uses to which the property or what it produces
is put by the taxpayer. (emphasis added).
Treas. Reg. 1.212-1(C) (1957).
'The burden of proof is always upon the taxpayer claiming deductions to prove
that the facts of his situation meet the requirements of the statute. Hirsch v. Com-
missioner, 315 F.2d 731, 738 (9
t h Cir. 1963); Wilson v. Eisner, 282 F. 38, 42 (2d
Cir. 1922); see Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 US. 467 (1943).
'The court ruled in Coffey v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 204 (5 th Cir. 1944), that
in a hobby "the objective is pleasure or relaxation .... " Id. at 205.
6INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212(2); note 2 supra.
7428 F.2d 1316 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
,In this case, the court accepted the definition of "primarily" used by the
Supreme Court in Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966): "We hold that, as used
in § 1221(1), 'primarily' means 'of first importance' or 'principally'." Id. at 572.
Although the Supreme Court was addressing itself to a capital gain provision, the
Wrightsman court was of the opinion that this definition was equally applicable to
the use of the term in Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(c). 428 F.2d at 132o n.5.
"Charles and Jayne Wrightsman began to acquire art works as a hobby in 1947.
The success of Charles Wrightsman in the oil business during the following years
made it possible for them to invest millions of dollars. After thoroughly studying
the more conventional forms of investment and refusing to follow the recom-
mendations of many financially astute acquaintances, the Wrightsmans decided
that collecting art was a most attractive outlet for their surplus capital. Their
enthusiasm for art is reflected by numerous facts including their constant association
with well known art experts, their frequent travel to places of artistic interest,
and their extensive self-education in their chosen field. Id. at 1317-21.
"0A catalog of the Wrightsman Collection fills twenty-six looseleaf volumes and
requires a shelf space of about five feet. Mr. Francis J. B. Watson, the Surveyor
of the Queen's Works of Art and Director of the Wallace Collection of London,
was in the process of producing for the Metropolitan Museum a five volume treatise
on the Wrightsman Collection at the time of the trial. Id. at 1319.
"By 1967, the Wrightsman Collection was valued for insurance purposes in
excess of $s6.8 million. Id. at 1317.
19711
232 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
the plaintiffs lived for no more than thirty days each year.' 2 The re-
mainder of the collection was kept in their Florida home or was on
loan to the Metropolitan Museum in New York.'3 This action arose
when the plaintiffs sought to recover alleged overpayments of federal
income tax.14 These overpayments represented claimed deductions
denied the Wrightsmans for expenses incurred in maintaining their
art collection.' 5
Although the tax commissioner had been satisfied that the plain-
tiffs' evidence demonstrated a primary investment purpose,16 the
Court of Claims reversed his decision on appeal by the Internal Rev-
enue Service. This court found that the plaintiffs' art collection was
held primarily for pleasure.lT Consequently, all expenditures inci-
dental to the Wrightsmans' art collection were ruled to be nondeduct-
ible, personal expenses under section 262 of the Code.' 8 One judge dis-
'SIt was the Wrightsmans' custom to reside from late November until late
April at their home in Florida. Beginning about the first of May they would live
in their New York apartment. From June until fall they would travel abroad.
Id. at 1318.
'"On the basis of insurance evaluation, 77.8 percent of the collection is housed
in the Wrightsmans' New York apartment, 17.7 percent in their Florida home, and
about 4-5 percent is on loan to the Metropolitan Museum in New York. Id. at 1321.
"'The amounts of these alleged overpayments were $5,911.20 for ig6o and
$21,199.78 for 1961, plus interest. Id. at 1317.
15These expenses were claimed as deductions pursuant to section 212 of the
Internal Revenue Code. Note 2 supra. Included among these expenses were the
costs of insurance, subscriptions, services, shipping costs, miscellaneous expenses,
and maintenance (which included the costs of air conditioning and humidity
controls). These expenses are described in detail in the commissioner's report.
Wrightsman v. United States, 7 CCH 1969 STAND. FED. TAx RE'. 7910.
"'The tax commissioner had been satisfied by the plaintiffs' evidence that the
primary purpose of their art collecting activity was to make a profit. This evidence
included the following facts: The plaintiffs had openly and frequently expressed
an intention to collect art as an investment; they followed the identical business
procedures in purchasing new additions for their collection as they used to secure
other investments; the investment potential of each item was carefully recorded;
the value of their art investments had increased substantially; and the plaintiffs had
demonstrated that they would sell and have sold items which failed to increase in
value. Furthermore, the commissioner noted that the plaintiffs' conduct had been
fully consistent with their expressed intentions. Although he acknowledged that the
Wrightsmans received a certain amount of pleasure from their collection, the
commissioner analogized their aotivity to that of the part-time farmers for whom
similar deductions were allowed whenever their activities were found to be carried
on primarily for profit. Wrightsman v. United States, 7 CCH 1969 STAND. F.D. TAX
REP. 7910.
"7According to the majority, "[t]he complete record does establish, to the
contrary [of investment being the primary purpose of the plaintiffs], personal
pleasure or satisfaction as plaintiffs' primary purpose." 428 F.2d at 1322.
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 262 provides: "Except as otherwise expressly pro-
CASE COMMENTS
sented, noting that this was an extremely close decision in which great
weight should have been given to the opinion of the commissioner,
who had the advantage of being able to judge the demeanor and credi-
bility of the parties. 19
In reaching its decision, the majority refused to be bound by
either of the government's proposed theories as to how the require-
ments of the regulation should be met. One theory maintained that
the plaintiffs should be denied recovery since they had not shown "any
action on their part inconsistent with the holding of their collection
for pleasure .... -20 The other theory, which the court called the
"physical segregation-pleasure preclusion standard,"21 was an attempt
by the government to devise a definite rule for determining the art in-
vestor's primary purpose. This rule, simply stated, would prevent art
investors from deducting expenses related to their collections unless
they separated themselves from their art works in such a way as to prove
that personal pleasure was not their most important consideration. 22
Since the mere receipt of pleasure from an activity is insufficient to
prove that it is not carried on for the production of income,23 the
vided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family
expenses."
The plaintiffs in the principal case had also claimed the $1,ooo maximum
deduction for a capital loss resulting from the sale of some art items. 428 F.2d at
1317 n.2. The government conceded that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover on
this claim "if it be determined they were investors in their works of art." Id. It is
not clear whether this deduction was granted in that the court recognized the
existence of an investment purpose. Id. at 1322. No further mention of this claim
is made in the opinion. Presumably, since the court ruled that the plaintiffs were
not primarily investors, this loss was also considered as a personal hobby expense
and the deduction was denied.
194 2 8 F.2d at 1323-24. The commissioner's determination carries a presumption
of validity. Drybrough v. Commissioner, 376 F.2d 350, 360 (6th Cir. 1967); Cf.
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289-91 (1960); Bessenyey v. Commissioner,
379 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1967); Imbesi v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 640, 643 (3 d Cir. 1966);
Fa. R. CIv. P. 52(a).
-I428 F.2d at 1319.
2Id. at 1320.
2For authority to support this rule, the government cited Juliet P. Hamilton,
25 B.T.A. 1317 (1932), in which a taxpayer was denied a deduction for the loss
on the sale of a painting that she displayed in her personal residence, and R. Foster
Reynolds, 14 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 45,276 (1945) afj'd, 155 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1946) ,
in which a taxpayer was allowed a deduction for the sale of a diamond necklace
kept in a safety deposit box and at no time used by the taxpayer or any member
of his family. The majority in Wrightsman found neither decision controlling, dis-
tinguishing Hamilton upon a lack of an investment-type activity, and Reynolds
upon its absence of any personal use. 428 F.2d at 1323.
2There is no duty imposed upon the plaintiffs in such cases to prove that their
activity is not pleasurable. It may be pleasurable so long as it is not carried on as
a mere hobby. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Field, 67 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1933); Worrell
v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 992 (S.D. Tex. 1966); Wright v United States, 249 F.
Supp. 5o8 (D. Nev. 1965).
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court refused to recognize a legal basis for the application of either
theory.24 Instead, the majority ruled that the primary purpose must
be determined "by consideration of all the circumstances," the only
standard specifically mentioned in the applicable Treasury Regula-
tion.
2 5
Determining when a taxpayer should be permitted deductions for
expenses incurred in part-time activities has been a problem of the
courts for nearly a half century.26 In one of the earliest cases, Thacher
v. Lowe,2 7 Judge Learned Hand expressed this view of the situation:
[Wjhile I should be the last to say that the making of a profit
was not in itself a pleasure, I hope I should also be one of those
to agree there were other pleasures than making a profit. In-
deed, it makes no difference whether a man is engaged in busi-
ness which gives him pleasure, if it be a business .... But it does
make a difference whether the occupation . . .can honestly be
said to be carried on for profit.28
In many of the decisions that followed Thacher, the courts were satis-
fied with evidence of the mere existence of a sincere, profit-making in-
tent.29 Determining whether there was an actual intent to realize in-
come from an activity placed the court in the difficult position of hav-
ing to judge the petitioner's state of mind.30 Often the courts attempted
to distinguish a taxpayer's actual intent from his expressed intent to
make a profit by considering the circumstances of his activity.31 A var-
2'The majority stated that it was unaware of any authority "for the interpreta-
tions which defendant places upon the applicable legal standard." 429 F.2d at 1320.
1'Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(c) (1957); note 3 supra.
OSuch problems first began to arise under the Revenue Act of 1916, which
allowed deductions from uncompensated losses incurred in transactions entered into
for profit. See, e.g., Wilson v. Eisner, 282 F. 38 (2d Cir. 1922); Plant v. Walsh, 28o
F. 722 (D. Conn. 1922).
"288 F. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
MId. at 995. The petitioner in Thacher was a lawyer who attempted to deduct
losses sustained in gentlemanly farming.
2In many of the "hobby loss" cases, the taxpayer's possibility of making a
profit seemed so remote under the circumstances that the court found reason to
suspect that he -had never intended to make a profit. E.g., Brodrick v. Derby, 236
F.2d 35 (ioth Cir. 1956) (oilman incurred consistent losses in raising harness
horses); Farish v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 63 (sth Cir. 1939) (oilman incurred
consistent losses raising polo ponies); DuPont v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 223
(1937) (industrial tycoon equipped a financially disastrous expedition to find the
Central American "White Indian").
3°See, e.g., Weir v. Commissioner, 1o9 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 194o); George F.
Tyler, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 47,058 (1947).
31As the court held in Tatt v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1948),
"intent may he proved by circumstances, and that a party's testimony as to his
intent may be rebutted by proof of circumstances which are inconsistent therewith."
166 F.2d at 698. See, e.g., Foran v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1958);
Brodrick v. Derby, 236 F.2d 35 (0oth Cir. 1956),
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iety of factors have been considered in determining this actual intent,
such as the carrying on of a businesslike operation,32 a conscientious
effort to succeed in that business, 33 and, if not an actual financial gain,
at least the hope that a profit would be realized in the near future.
3 4
When such circumstances were consistent with the petitioner's express-
ed intent to make a profit, his actual intent was recognized by the
court and deductions for his expenses and losses35 were allowed.
Since 1957, section 1.212-1 (c) of the Treasury Regulations has
specifically stated that the purpose for which property is being held is
"not to be determined solely from the intention of the taxpayer....-"3 6
This provision would appear to make the taxpayer's intent to make a
profit merely a factor in determining his purpose. However, court-
determined actual intent to make a profit is so closely akin to profit-
making purpose37 that the cases which utilized the former criterion
Four indicia of an intention to maintain a profit-making business were de-
scribed in Amos S. Bumgardner, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 20,151 (1954): (1) a
thorough preliminary exploration of the field and the possibilities for profit:
(2) the consultation of experts and the hiring of qualified help or assistants; (3)
considerable personal attention to the enterprise; and (4) a businesslike method of
accounting for income and expenses. As was pointed out by the tax commissioner,
the facts of the principal case satisfied all of these considerations. For additional
characteristics of a businesslike operation, see 5 J. MFRTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION § 28.73 (i969).
nSee, e.g., Doggett v. Burnett, 65 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Laura M. Curtis, 28
B.T.A. 631 (1933).
-'See, eg., Hirsch v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 731, 736 (9th Cir. 1963); Higgins
v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 252, 255 (Ct. Cl. 1948); DuPont v. United States, 234
F. Supp. 681, 686 (D. Del. 1964).
5INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165 provides in part:
(a) General rule.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any
loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by
insurance or otherwise.
(c) Limitation on losses of individuals-In the case of an indi-
vidual, the deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited to-
(i) Losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) Losses incurred in any transaction entered into for
profit, though not connected with a trade or business ....
Section 165(c) may be traced to the original revenue act. Note 24 supra. Since the
taxpayer must show that he has entered into a transaction for profit in order to
claim a loss deduction the problems that arise under this provision are similar to
those that arise in interpreting Treasury Regulation § 1.212-1(a). Cf. Carkhuff v.
Commissioner, 425 F.2d 1400 (6th Cir. 1970) (the court used the precedent of a
bad debt case, Hirsch v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 731 (9 th Cir. 1963), to declare
that the predominant purpose of property for which expense deductions are
claimed must be to derive income).
NTreas. Reg. § 1.212-I(c) (1957); note 3 supra.
',The distinctions in meaning between such terms as "intent," "motive," and
"purpose" are often unclear. Note the discussion of Judge Clark in Weir v. Com-
missioner, 109 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1940), where intent is given three distinct legal
1971"]
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before the Regulation are still helpful in discussing the problems that
arise under it.
In past cases, courts have been most inclined to permit deductions
for maintenance expenses when there was no personal use of the prop-
erty held for the production of income.38 Thus, while the expenses of
decorating a personal residence are normally nondeductible,3 9 the
petitioner in Cecil v. Commissioner o was permitted to deduct the
cost of interior decorations when they were necessary to open a mansion
for paid, public admission. In reaching this result, the circuit court
noted that the property was not the personal residence of the taxpayer,
and would not be used for her "personal pleasure, or social diversion,
or as a hobby.. .. "41
Confusing the issue, however, is the fact that there have been deci-
sions where the taxpayer's personal use of pleasurable investment prop-
erty did not preclude deductions.42 In George F. Tyler,43 the Tax Court
acknowledged that the plaintiff, who invested heavily in stamps, 44 re-
ceived personal pleasure from his collection. However, the court was
satisfied that profit was his primary purpose in that he participated in
few of the activities of a stamp hobbyist.45 Tyler did not subscribe to
any philatelic publications, join any stamp collecting organizations, or
meet regularly with other stamp collectors.4 6 Thus, he was able to satisfy
the court of his profit-making purpose by demonstrating actions on his
part that were inconsistent with the holding of a stamp collection for
pleasure.
47
While the court in Tyler interpreted limited involvement as an in-
meanings. Cf. 428 F.2d at 1323 (dissenting opinion) ("investment intent" and "in-
vestment purpose" used interchangeably); Bessenyey v. Commissioner, 379 F.2d
252, 256 (2d Cir. 1967) ("intention" and "motive" used interchangeably).
"'See, e.g., Hopkins v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 16o (195o); R. Foster Reynolds,
14 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 45,276 (1945).
'See Jones v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1968); Kirkland v. United
States, 267 F. Supp. 259 (D. Neb. 1967).
"ioo F.2d 896 (4 th Cir. 1939).
"Id. at goo.
zrrhe best examples are the farm cases where the taxpayer was successful ;n
claiming loss deductions in spite of his personal, social, or recreational use of the
farm. See, e.g., Thomas Watson, 12 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 43,441 (1943); Walter P.
Temple, io B.T.A. 1238, 1241 (1928).
416 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 47,058 (1947).
"Tyler had expended $448,o37.97 in accumulating his collection of rare stamps.
Id. at 225.
6id. at 228.
"It was not unnecessary for Tyler to study philately extensively since his in-
vestments were selected by an agent who was an expert. Id. at 224-25.
4"Cf. note 23 and accompanying text supra.
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dication that profit was the petitioner's "principal motivation, 4
8
other courts have considered an active involvement as being indicative
of the same intent. The latter view is manifested by Laura M. Curtis,49
a case in which the petitioner was interested in horses and kept a stable.
The Tax Court ruled that her activity was primarily for profit al-
though she kept no books and made no profits. The court was impressed
by the extensive time that she devoted to this activity.50 The fact that
the Tax Court was able to find a profit-making intent from opposite
types of involvement may best be explained by the comparative wealth
of the two parties. Unlike Tyler, the taxpayer in Curtis was not a
multimillionaire who could afford to devote a great deal of time to an
unprofitable venture.51 As a federal judge noted in Bessenyey v. Com-
missioner 2 a case in which a wealthy woman was denied deductions for
a horse breeding activity, "the Tax Court's approach to a study of the
motives of the very rich would seem to be materially different from the
approach to a study of the motives of the rest of us."3 It appears much
easier for courts to find that a wealthy man becomes involved in a
pleasurable investment activity primarily for pleasure.54 This theory
finds support in cases where the plaintiff's high income and ability to
withstand losses have been cited as indications that he was not primar-
ily concerned with profits. 5 Therefore, it appears that the greater the
taxpayer's wealth, the more difficult it is for him to prove by all the
circumstances that profit, and not pleasure, is the primary purpose of
his activity.
By insisting that the plaintiffs must prove a primary investment
1116 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 47,058 at 228.
1128 B.T.A. 631 (1933)"
wId.
aTyler, a banker, invested $7,926,533.76 in securities during the same period
in which he invested nearly half a million in his stamp collection. 16 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 47,058 at 228. Curtis, a shopkeeper, was unable to withstand too many
losses and was eventually forced to give up her stable. 28 B.T.A. at 631-32.
r'79 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1967).
1Id. at 259 (concurring opinion).
r4As was noted by the court in Whitman v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 845
(W.D. La. 1965), "surely it is easier to hold that an executive of General Motors,
a banker, or a coupon clipping fox hunter has engaged in farming for pleasure
only, than a construction worker whose wealth is apparently commensurate." Id.
at 854. In accord with this observation was Eugene J. Davis, 35 P-H TAx Ct. Mem.
66,ix6 (1966), where the Tax Court noted a construction engineer's "modest
means" in finding that he operated his unsuccessful farm for profit. Id.
"See, e.g., Bessenyey v. Commissioner, 379 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1967); Ellen R.
Schley, 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65,111 (1965). But see Commissioner v. Widener,
33 F.2d 833 (3 d Cir. 1929).
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purpose,56 the Wrightsman court was able to recognize the existence
of such a purpose without granting the plaintiffs the benefit of a de-
duction.57 However, a careful reading of section 1.212-1 (c) reveals that
while the term "primarily" is used several times, the regulation does
not say that property held for the production of income must be held
primarily for the production of income. Instead, it insists only that such
property should not be held "primarily as a sport, hobby, or recrea-
tion." 8 Therefore, although the Wrightsman court ruled that the
plaintiffs "failed to sustain their burden of proving the primacy of
their investment purpose,"5 9 it can be argued that the only burden of
proof actually imposed upon the plaintiffs by the regulation is that
they must prove they did not hold art works primarily for pleasure.
Since the court found that personal pleasure was the plaintiffs' primary
purpose,60 the identical result would have been reached under either
interpretation of the regulation. The difference, however, could affect
a future petitioner's approach. If he were only required to prove that
pleasure was not his primary purpose, the best methods for doing this
are suggested by the alternate theories proposed by the government
in the principal case.6 1
The first theory, which would grant deductions to the art investor
who is able to demonstrate actions that are inconsistent with the hold-
ing of art works for pleasure, is similar to the method used by the peti-
tioner in Tyler to prove that he was not primarily a hobbyist. 62 Since
devoting a great deal of time to the study of art would appear to be as
beneficial to the prudent art investor as it would be enjoyable to the
r4428 F.2d at 1820.
6'The following adaptation from Sweeney, The Farm Loss Deduction, 53
A.B.A.J. 446 (1967), is an example of how a high-income taxpayer might benefit
from such a deduction: If an art investor is in the seventy percent bracket with
most of his income from other sources, and his art investment expenses exceed the
income of his collection in a particular tax year by $2o,ooo, then he could claim
this amount as expenses that are necessary to the maintenance of investment pro-
perty and offset it against his other income. He is out of pocket $2o,ooo, but he
has recouped seventy percent of that amount and it actually costs him only thirty
cents for every dollar that is spent on his collection. That amount is more than re-
covered through long-term appreciation in the value of the art works. The net
result is that a wealthy art investor can maintain a substantial collection and divert
the major portion of its maintenance costs to the government.
r8Note 3 supra.
604 2 8 F.2d at 1323.
0Id at 1322.
"Notes 2o and 21 and accompanying text supra.
"Note 45 supra.
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art hobbyist,6 3 the method of satisfying the requirement of the regula-
tion would only rarely be available to the art investor.
The second theory, which would require the art investor to show
a physical separation from his art works, could be given wider applica-
tion. Although Treasury Regulation 1.212-1 (c) provides that considera-
tion will be given to the uses to which the investment property is put,
it gives no guidance as to how these uses are to be judged.64 The deter-
mination of when the taxpayer's use of property indicates that it is
being held primarily as a sport, hobby, or recreation is apparently a
matter left to the discretion of the court. Thus, the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit recently held in Carkhuff v. Commissioner6 5 that
four months personal use of a vacation cabin was sufficient to preclude
the taxpayer from claiming deductions for the expenses of maintain-
ing the cabin as a rental property during other times of the year.66
And in the principal case, the court found the Wrightsmans' personal
use of their collection to be "extensive" 67 although they lived in the
apartment where the major portion of the collection was housed for
only one month each year.68 It is apparent, therefore, that some courts
will consider even limited personal use of pleasurable investment prop-
erty sufficient to preclude the taxpayer's claim for deductions. Without
a definite rule, there is no way for the art investor to judge when his
personal use of his investments will preclude his claims for deductions. 69
In Carkhuff, the court of appeals ruled that the "predominant pur-
pose" 70 of investment property must be to derive income. To support
"As was noted in the principal case, Charles Wrightsman believed that thorough
knowledge of an investment was a requisite factor to financial success. 428 F.2d at
1317. Unlike Tyler, the Wrightsmans were deeply involved in the subject matter
of their investment. They subscribed to every major art periodical, maintained an
extensive art library, and associated with a large number of noted art experts.
Indeed, they had become recognized experts in their own right. Brief for the
Plaintiff at io-i6, Wrightsman v. United States, 428 F.2d 1316 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
"Note 3 supra.
u425 F.2d 14oo (6th Cir. 1970).
"6d. at 1405. The Carkhuffs made their cabin available for rent at least eight
months a year. But in ruling that a primary profit intent had not been demon-
strated, the court observed, among other things, that "[ilt is noteworthy that of
four and one-half months of peak rental periods, taxpayers reserved the cottage
for their personal use for two of those months. 425 F.zd at 1405.
61428 F.2d at 1321.
68Note 10 supra.
"The majority in Wrightsman seemed content to leave the issue in an un-
settled state when it reached the following conclusion:
This, despite defendant's urging that "the issue [must] not
be left to a miscellaneous assortment of factors for varying judg-
ment in each case." Clearly, we think, by the nature of the issue
it must.
428 F.2d at 1323.
';425 F.2d at 14o4.
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this rule, the court cited Hirsch v. Commissioner7' and Treasury Regu-
lation 1.212-1. Although decided in 1963, the Hirsch case interpreted
the bad debt section of the Internal Revenue Code of 193972 and was
therefore not concerned with the meaning of the present regulation. As
has been pointed out,73 1.212-1 (c) does not clearly support such a rule.
Furthermore, a federal district court expressed direct opposition to the
Hirsch ruling a year later in DuPont v. United States.74 The court
stated:
A rule which would require that the profit motive dominate
all other considerations ... is not a realistic test. It is enough,
as many of the cases have recognized, that a taxpayer have a
bona fide interest and purpose in making the venture a profit-
able one. If he has, the fact that he also obtains non-monetary
rewards is irrelevant.75
In spite of these objections, however, the recent acceptance of the
primary purpose requirement by both the Sixth Circuit and the Court
of Claims is likely to make this rule established law.78
Because of the pleasure inherent in exposure to works of art and
the resulting difficulties in proving a primary investment purpose, the
art investor who wishes to be assured that his expenses will be deduct-
ible may find it necessary as a practical matter to segregate himself
physically from his collection. While it may appear harsh in a cultural
sense to regard art objects as purely monetary commodities that must
7315 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1963). In this case, the court refused to allow the tax-
payer to deduct the money he had expended on a racing association since the
petitioner had not provided sufficient evidence to prove these expenses were incurred
in carrying on a trade or business. The following language of the Hirsch court in-
fluenced the Carkhuff decision:
While the expectation of the taxpayer need not be reasonable,
and immediate profit from the business is not necessary, neverthe-
less, the basic and dominant intent behind the taxpayer's activities,
out of which the claimed expenses or debts were incurred, must be
ultimately to make a profit on income from those very same
activities.
315 F.2d at 736 (emphasis added). Accord, Carkhuff v. Commissioner, 425 F.2d 1400,
1404 (6th Cir. 197o); Lamont v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 377, 380 (2d Cir. 1964);
Wright v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 508, 513 (D. Nev. 1965).
72INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 23.
"'Note 58 and accompanying text supra.
74234 F. Supp. 681 (D. Del. 1964).
-Id. at 685.
OSee Lamont v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 377, 380 (2d Cir. 1964); Godfrey v.
Commissioner, 335 F.2d 82, 84 (6th Cir. 1964); Wright v. United States, 249 F.
Supp. 508, 513 (D. Nev. 1965). In accord with the view expressed in DuPont T'.
United States, 234 F. Supp. 681 (D. Del. 1964), are many of the older cases. See, e.g.,
Deering v. Blair, 23 F.2d 975, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1928); Thacher v. Lowe, 288 F. 994
(S.D.N.Y. 1922).
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languish in the depths of a safety deposit box, 77 the physical segrega-
tion-pleasure preclusion standard rejected by Wrightsman could func-
tion to the public good if art investors were allowed to deduct the costs
of maintaining their collections in public places for the free enjoyment
of the community. A system of this nature would make it easier for
the courts to recognize the true art investor. It would also encourage
the art investor not to hoard art treasures in his personal residence.
Furthermore, this suggestion could benefit art museums and other
public institutions by enabling them to depend upon art investors for
loaned exhibits. 78 At the present time, however, deductions are not
usually allowable for the maintenance of property whose free use has
been contributed to nonprofit organizations.79
For the art collector who would find it difficult to demonstrate the
circumstances necessary to show a primary investment purpose, a new
section of the Code, section 183,80 offers a possible alternative. This
provision allows deductions for an activity that is not engaged in for
profit, but only to the extent of the taxpayer's gross income from that
activity.8' Since there is no necessity that the taxpayer demonstrate a
profit intent, the primary purpose requirement may be avoided. It is
necessary, however, that there be income from this activity; and though
77SATuRDAY Rmvmw, Jan. 31, 1970, at 6s.
"'In the Wrightsman situation, for example, only the expenses for maintaining
the 4.5 percent of the collection that was on loan to the Metropolitan Museum
would be deductible if such a system were put into effect. Note 13 supra.
wn'he taxpayer will not receive a charitable deduction for the contribution of
the mere use of property. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 170(t)(3); see, e.g., Orr v. United
States, 226 F. Supp. 8o9 (M.D. Ala. x963), aff'd, 343 F.2d 553 (5 th Cir. 1965);
Mitchell v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 953 (1964); I.T. 3918, 1948-2 Cu. BULL. 33.
It should be noted however, that charging admission for the showing of an art
collection might be an excellent circumstance for proving a primary intention of
holding art works for profit. Cf. Cecil v. Commissioner, ioo F.2d 896 (4th Cir. 1939).
9°INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 183 provides in part:
SEC. 183. ACTIVITIES NOT ENGAGED IN FOR PROFIT.
(a) General rule.-In the case of an activity engaged in by an
individual or an electing small business corporation (as defined
in section 1371(b)), if such activity is not engaged in for profit, no
deduction attributable to such activity shall be allowed under this
chapter except as provided in this section.
(b) Deductions allowable.-In the case of an activity not en-
gaged in for profit to which subsection (a) applies, there shall
be allowed-
(2) a deduction equal to the amount of the deductions which
would be allowable under this chapter for the taxable year only to
the extent that the gross income derived from such activity for the
taxable year exceeds the deductions allowable by reason of para-
graph (i).
8mINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 183(b)(a); note 8o infra.
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